# The Impact of Adam Smith's Rejection of Transcendence on Ethics
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Chapter 1: Understanding Adam Smith's Ethical Framework
In the third chapter of her work, Dr. McCloskey discusses Adam Smith's ethical philosophy, emphasizing that he did not reduce ethics to a single virtue, unlike the tendencies of the Enlightenment. This period often simplified complex ethical systems to a singular principle—be it the Good, the categorical imperative, or the greatest utility. Such reductionism aims to select one of the seven virtues, like prudence, justice, or love, to represent all others (p. 195). Previously, McCloskey highlighted that Smith's ethical stance relied on a blend of four and a half of Aquinas's seven virtues: courage, justice, temperance, prudence, and benevolence (the secular aspect of love).
Adam Smith's Legacy: Beyond Max U
In the preceding chapter, we examined how Kant's emphasis on intentions and Bentham's focus on outcomes dominate contemporary thought, leading us to interpret Smith primarily through the lens of prudence. This lack of appreciation for virtue ethics obscures the depth of Smith's ideas. McCloskey posits that Smith was among the last proponents of virtue ethics during the late 1700s, coinciding with the Enlightenment's rise. However, a resurgence of virtue ethics began with Elizabeth Anscombe's influential essay in 1958, "Modern Moral Philosophy." She argued for a richer vocabulary in ethics, suggesting that instead of labeling actions as "morally wrong," one might specify them as "untruthful," "unchaste," or "unjust" (p. 194). This approach provides a broader toolkit for ethical decision-making.
Section 1.1: The Multifaceted Nature of Decision-Making
When making choices, individuals can embody prudence (considering costs and benefits), justice (evaluating impacts on others), temperance (maintaining moderation), and courage (exhibiting character strength). This complexity is not easily distilled into a straightforward process; rather, it demands significant reflection, study, and practice. Nevertheless, even with a more comprehensive ethical framework than the current prudence-centric Max U model, Smith's philosophy lacked the Christian virtues of faith, hope, and agape love. His choice to forgo transcendent virtues paved the way for the reductionist ethics prevalent today.
Section 1.2: The Enlightenment's Shift Away from Religion
Understanding why Enlightenment thinkers, including Smith, distanced themselves from religiosity is crucial. For centuries, religion had pervaded society, but often fell short of its biblical ideals, as human implementation led to failures. McCloskey points out that Smith opposed the prevailing "rigid Calvinism" in Scotland, which even barred atheists like David Hume from academic positions (p. 196). The violent conflicts between Catholics and Protestants further motivated Enlightenment thinkers to find a more grounded ethical framework.
Chapter 2: Smith's Deliberate Choice to Dismiss Transcendence
McCloskey suggests that Smith, aligned with Enlightenment figures like Hume and Voltaire, rejected virtues seen as conventionally religious. In the eighteenth century, hope and faith appeared outdated to these advanced thinkers, who sought a new world devoid of religious superstition and the strife caused by sectarian divides. They aimed to establish a new foundation based on reason and propriety, discarding what they considered the "silliness" of faith, hope, and transcendent love (p. 196).
Despite their aspirations, it becomes clear that these "silly" virtues provide people with purpose and a reason for existence. In our contemporary reality, where reason reigns supreme, many individuals experience loneliness, anxiety, and a lack of direction.
Conclusion: Reevaluating the Enlightenment's Legacy
Reflecting on the Enlightenment's desire to dismantle religious dogma reveals the pitfalls of their approach. Living in the world they shaped, it is apparent that the absence of transcendent values results in a reliance solely on human reasoning for defining morality. This has led to a self-centered society, where individuals determine their own notions of good and evil, devoid of an objective standard. Adam Smith's misstep, emblematic of the Enlightenment's broader ambition, was an attempt to liberate humanity from transcendence, often dismissing it in favor of procedural ethics like the impartial spectator or the categorical imperative (p. 197).
In hindsight, it may have been more prudent to demand that those in religious authority adhere to the virtues of faith, hope, and love rather than completely discarding them, leaving society unanchored.
Reference: McCloskey, Deirdre Nansen, 2016. “That is, He was No Reductionist, Economistic or Otherwise,” Chapter 21 of Bourgeois Equality, The University of Chicago Press.